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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A(3)(b) (Supp. 2008). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Appellant claims that the Trial Court's denial of his motion to suppress violated his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION AT TRIAL COURT 
Issues: 
The issues raised in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Was the scope of the search warrant violated? 
2. Were the Appellant's Fourth Amendment Rights violated when his blood was 
tested for a controlled substance? 
3. Did the Appellant give up his expectation of privacy when his blood sample was 
taken? 
4. Was the evidence validly obtained for THC testing? 
5. Was the scope of the search and seizure limited? 
6. Was the Trial Court correct by denying the Appellant's motion to suppress the 
results of the drug-screening test? 
1 
Standard of Review: 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness, including its 
application of the law to the facts. See State v. Tripp, 227 P. 3d 1251,1257 (Utah 2010). The 
trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. 
Issue Preservation in Trial Court: 
The issues stated above were preserved in the Trial Court by the Appellant's motion to 
suppress, R 38, memorandum supporting motion to suppress, R 40, supplement to motion to 
suppress, R 113, motion to reconsider, R 315, memorandum supporting motion to reconsider, 
R 317, and the Appellant's reply memorandum, R 159. (These papers are contained in the 
Addendum to this brief as Addendums 1, 2, 3,4, 5, and 6, respectively.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 11th, 2009, the Trial Court, ruling from the bench, denied the Appellant's 
motion to suppress the toxicology final report completed on September 29, 2008, showing that 
the Appellant tested positive for Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principle component of 
marijuana, R 309. In his motion to suppress, the Appellant claims that the search warrant 
provided that his blood be tested based upon the affidavit for search warrant asking that the 
Appellant's blood be tested to determine its alcohol level, R 38 and R 40. 
The Trial Court acknowledged that the issue presented in this case is one of first 
impression in Utah and stated that the basis for denying the Appellant's motion to suppress was 
the "good language" found in the case of Pharr v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 646 S.E. 2d 453, 
2 
462 (2007), see the Court's ruling, R 309-310 and R 348-351, Addendum 7, at paragraph 20. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. That on September 5th, 2008, at 6:56 p.m., officers from the Weber County 
Sheriffs Office responded to a fatal auto accident that occurred at Plain City, 
Utah. PH P6 L10-25, PH P7 Ll-25, PH P22 L23-25, and PH P23 Ll-2. 
2. That it was determined that the Appellant failed to yield the right-of-way at an 
intersection and struck a crossing automobile. PH PI 1 L13-25. 
3. That Mr. Ryan Read, a deputy of the Weber County Sheriffs Office, interviewed 
the Appellant at the scene and believed he could smell a slight odor of alcohol on 
the Appellant's breath. PH P9 L22-25 and BH P21 L8-16. 
4. Deputy Read conducted no field sobriety tests at the scene, nor did he observe 
indications of drug use, such as a red or flushed face, pinpoint pupils of the eyes, 
or red or bloodshot eyes. BH P58 L10-25 and BH P59 Ll-15. 
5. That as a result, Deputy Read asked the Appellant if he had been drinking and the 
Appellant responded that he had not consumed alcohol at anytime that day. PH 
P14 L22-25 and PH P15 Ll-2. 
6. That the Appellant agreed to submit to a sobriety test, conducted by Deputy Read 
using his portable breath testing device. PH P10 L3-5. 
7. That test results given by the portable Breathalyzer registered .008. PH P21 L8-
14. 
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That Deputy Read asked the Appellant to accompany him to the Weber County 
Sheriffs Office and the Appellant agreed. PH P10 L8-16. 
That during the drive to the sheriffs office, Deputy Read believed he could smell 
alcohol on the Appellant's breath. BH P21 L17-24. 
That when arriving at the sheriffs office, Deputy Read requested that the 
Appellant submit to a blood draw to determine his blood alcohol level. BH P23 
L2-3. 
That because the Appellant had already submitted to a breath test, he refused to 
submit to a blood draw. BH P23 L5-13. 
That the Appellant was placed under arrest for driving with a detectable amount 
of alcohol in his system. BH P23 L15-18. 
That Deputy Read prepared a search warrant, attached to the Addendum of this 
brief as Addendum 8, and an affidavit, attached to the Addendum of this brief as 
Addendum 9. BH P23 L19-24. 
That the affidavit, search warrant, and return were admitted in evidence. BH P29 
L12-18. 
That over the strenuous objection of the Appellant, voir dire examination of 
Deputy Read and legal arguments presented by the Appellant, BH P30 L23-25, 
BH P31-40, the trial court admitted the toxicology final report in evidence. BH 
P40 L22-23. 
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16. That pursuant to the search warrant, the Appellant's blood was drawn and a 
sample thereof sent the Utah State Bureau of Forensic Toxicology. BH P30 L6-9. 
17. That the final toxicology report, R 330, attached to the Addendum of this brief as 
Addendum 10, shows negative for alcohol and positive for THC. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant's argument is that because the district court did not authorize the State to 
test the Appellant's blood for anything other than alcohol content, the scope of the search was 
violated and the Appellant's Fourth Amendment Rights were violated when the State tested the 
Appellant's blood for a presence of a controlled substance and the Trial Court erred by denying 
the Appellant's motion to suppress the results of the drug-screening test. 
ARGUMENT 
(1) The scope of the search warrant was violated. 
The affidavit of Deputy Read is clear. It advises the Court: 
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, there is now 
certain property or evidenced described as: 
Blood: Your Affiant is asking that a blood sample be 
collected for testing to determine Jed Ozzie Price blood 
alcohol level. R 0130. 
Because Deputy Read conducted no field sobriety tests at the scene 
and because he did not observe indications of drug use, such as a red or 
flushed face, pinpoint pupils of the eyes, or red or bloodshot eyes, his sole 
observation of the Appellant was the "faint" smell of alcohol on his 
breath. BHP59-61. 
As a result, there is no room to argue that the warrant only 
authorized the State to test the Appellant's blood alcohol content. 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989): 
An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect 
privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or 
seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary 
acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen 
that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is 
narrowly limited in its objectives and scope. 
That a warrant is to be narrowly limited to its objectives and scope 
was enumerated by the Supreme Court of Utah in Anderson v. Taylor, 149 
P. 3d 352, 356 (2006) and the above-entitled Court in State v. Dominguez, 
206 P. 3d 640, 645 (2009). 
In this case, the warrant was narrowly limited in its objective and 
scope: a search of the Appellant's blood for alcohol content. 
The Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his blood 
was tested for a controlled substance. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a 
"compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol 
content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search". See Schmerber v. 
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California, 384 U.S. 757,768 (1966) and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 
760 (1968). 
It is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating 
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing 
chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological 
data is a further invasion of the tested employee's privacy 
interest. Skinner, Id. at 616. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court continued: 
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analyses of urine, 
like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts 
about an employee, including whether he or she is 
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Skinner, Id. at 617. 
Skinner established that the search for data, other than alcohol, is a, further 
invasion of privacy. The warrant in this case did not authorize testing the 
Appellant's blood for drugs, HIV, DNA information, blood type, or 
anything other than alcohol. 
Testing the seized blood for anything other than alcohol violated the scope 
of the warrant and was a further invasion of the Appellant's privacy. 
The Appellant did not give up his expectation of privacy when his blood 
sample was taken. 
In the case of Herman v. State, 128 P. 3d 469,473 (Nev. 2006), it 
is expressly stated that, "A person who volunteers DNA information for 
public use without expressly limiting the scope of his consent has no 
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expectation of privacy in his DNA profile." Support of this fashion is also 
given in the case of State v. McCord, 562 S.E. 2d 689, 693 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2002). 
In the above-entitled case, however, the Appellant did not consent 
to testing after Deputy Read's portable breath tester showed a .008 alcohol 
reading, and limitations of the blood sample were particularly expressed in 
the scope of the warrant. It was this particularity in the warrant's scope 
that satisfied the Appellant's constitutional rights. See State v. McCord, Id. 
Evidence was not validly obtained for THC testing. 
Valid seizure of evidence is dictated by an officer's protocol in 
order to satisfy a suspect's constitutional rights. In a situation that does 
not involve consent, whether expressly limited or not, an officer or 
detective must satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that search 
warrants must describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity 
to prevent a general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. See 
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,196 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927). This 
requirement of particularly describing things to be seized makes general 
searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing (such as 
searching the blood for THC) under a warrant describing another (the 
search of blood for its alcohol level). Applying this requirement to the 
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above-entitled case, the Appellant's blood was validly taken only for the 
purpose of measuring his blood alcohol level. 
(5) The scope of the search and seizure was limited. 
Applying Marron, Id, it was reasonable for the Appellant to 
expect privacy in all areas other than those specifically itemized in the 
scope of the search warrant. Therefore, the search of his blood for alcohol 
content was the only item validly authorized for scientific evaluation. 
(6) The results of the drug-screening test should be suppressed. 
The Trial Court erred by denying the Appellant's motion that the 
drug-screening test be suppressed. The basis for the denial was the Trial 
Court's reliance upon the language in the case of Pharr, Id, 
The facts of the above-entitled case are clearly distinguishable 
from the facts in Pharr, Id. Mr. Pharr was arrested in June of 2001 in 
connection with the offense of breaking and entering with intent to 
commit rape. Detectives asked Mr. Pharr for a buccal swab so they could 
compare his DNA to any DNA evidence found at the crime scene. Mr. 
Pharr stood up, opened his mouth, and let the detectives swab the inside of 
his mouth. 
After obtaining the buccal swab from Mr. Pharr, one of the 
detectives remembered similar circumstances of an unsolved case in 
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August of 1999. Mr. Pharr's DNA was compared to the DNA evidence 
from the 1999 unsolved case and there was a match. Thereafter, Mr. Pharr 
was indicted for the 1999 offense. 
A motion was filed to have his buccal swab and all related DNA 
evidence suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds, and the Trial Court 
denied the motion. On appeal, Mr. Pharr conceded that he voluntarily 
consented to the taking of the buccal swab so that police could compare 
his DNA profile to any DNA evidence found at the scene of the 2001 case. 
He claimed, however, that the use, by police, of his DNA profile for 
comparison to DNA evidence recovered from the victim in an unrelated 
case constituted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that because Mr. Pharr voluntarily 
consented to the swab and there were no express limitations placed on his 
DNA profile, the use by police of his DNA in an unrelated case did not 
constitute an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The "good language" in Pharr, Id, relied upon by the Trial Court in 
denying the Appellant's motion to suppress, is based upon the conclusion 
of the Virginia court that constitutional concerns had been satisfied 
because Mr. Pharr voluntarily consented to a buccal swab from him 
without expressing any limitation to its use. 
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In the above-entitled case, however, constitutional concerns have 
not been satisfied if the express limitations in the warrant issued by the 
Court on September 5th, 2008, are not honored. The statement "Your 
Affiant is asking that a blood sample be collected for testing to determine 
Jed Ozzie Price blood alcohol level" in Deputy Read's affidavit for search 
warrant, Addendum 9, constitutes an express limitation. If that limitation 
is not recognized, the Appellant's constitutional rights have been violated. 
The touchstone of the decision in Pharr, Id centers around the 
concept of "a reasonable expectation of privacy". The issue presented to 
the appellate court was whether or not Mr. Pharr, who voluntarily 
provided, without express limitation on its use, a DNA sample to the 
police during the investigation of a criminal offense, retained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that sample sufficient to prevent the police from 
using it in their investigation of an unrelated offense. The Virginia court 
observed that to resolve the question it must determine whether the 
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as 
reasonable. It determined that society is unwilling to recognize as 
reasonable the subjective expectation of privacy infringed upon by the 
government when a DNA sample, validly obtained, without express 
limitation, from a suspect in one criminal case is used to analyze and 
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compare the suspect's DNA in an unrelated criminal case. 
By comparison, in the above-entitled case the issue is whether or 
not blood drawn from the Appellant, pursuant to a search warrant that 
expressly limits testing to determine the alcohol level in the blood, can be 
used to show the THC level in the blood, without violating the Appellant's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Appellant contends and case law supports that society will 
recognize that he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy, based upon 
the express limitation in the search warrant that his blood be tested only 
for alcohol. 
In the process of researching case law, the Appellant's research 
team found the case of U.S. v. Carey, 172 R 3rd 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), a 
case with both "good language" and good facts. 
The Carey case centers around a search warrant allowing officers 
to search the files on Mr. Carey's computers for "names, telephone 
numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence 
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances." In the 
process of searching the contents, the detectives discovered that one file 
contained child pornography. At the trial court level, Mr. Carey moved to 
suppress the computer files containing child pornography and his motion 
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was denied. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the detectives 
exceeded the scope of the search warrant and that the Trial Court erred by 
refusing to suppress the child pornography obtained by the illegal search. 
Id at 1276. 
Utah's constitution vigorously protects citizens' rights. 
In construing the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court has 
remarked favorably about the analytical framework employed in State v. 
Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) which suggests the use of four principal 
sources of analytical material: (1) the history of the state constitution, (2) 
the textual construction of the provision, (3) a comparison with decisions 
of other state's courts construing their state constitutional provisions of 
similar or identical language, and (4) sociological materials. Id. at 236. 
See State v. Earl, 716 P2d 803,806 (Utah 1986) wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court states, "We cite with approval the summary of scholarly 
commentary and analytic technique set forth by the Supreme Court of 
Vermont in State v. Jewett*). The Jewett court indicated that these four 
approaches should not be considered exclusive of any other that an 
imaginative lawyer might offer, however. Jewett, Id. at 237 & n.12 and 
n.14, citing P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate - Theory of the Constitution 25 
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(1982) (describing six types of constitutional argument: the historical, the 
textual, the doctrinal, the prudential, the structural, and the ethical). 
According to Bobbitt, the historical argument examines the controversies, 
attitudes, and decisions of the period during which the constitutional 
provision at issue was proposed and ratified. Id. at 7. The textuial argument 
considers the present sense of the words of the provision. Id. Structural 
arguments are "claims that a particular principle or practical result is 
implicit in the structures of government and the relationships that are 
created by the Constitution among citizens and governments." Id. The 
prudential argument advances a particular doctrine according to the 
practical wisdom of the courts. Id. The doctrinal argument "asserts 
principles derived from precedent." Id. Finally, the ethical argument 
"relies on a characterization of American institutions and the role within 
them of the American people in attempting to legitimize judicial review of 
the constitutional provisions." Id. at 94. 
Looking at the history of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme 
Court has suggested that interpretation of the Utah Constitution may be 
greatly influenced by the historical events surrounding the drafting of the 
constitution. See eg, Society of Separatists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 
921 -29 (Utah 1993) (stating that "a page of history is worth a volume of 
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logic" and examining events surrounding Utah's admission to statehood to 
interpret state constitutional prohibition of expending public money to 
support religious exercise). 
Unfortunately, no direct legislative history is available concerning the 
decision to include Article I, section 14 in the Utah Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the intent of the drafters may be fairly inferred from the 
historical context in which the provision was included. Members of the 1895 
Utah Constitutional Convention understood from first-hand experience the 
necessity of adopting safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure. 
Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seizure Antipolygamy Raids, 62 Utah Hist. Q. 
316,317 (1994) (hereafter "Panek"). Utah pioneers suffered persecution at 
the hands of murderous mobs in Ohio and Illinois, fled the extermination 
order of Missouri's Governor Boggs, and suffered more persecution in the 
Utah Territory from federal marshals engaged in warrantless raids of their 
homes in search of polygamy-law offenders. The Desert News recounted the 
warrantless Utah raids as "outrages," "carried out without even a warrant 
giving the perpetrators the authority [to search]." Panek, at 327 (quoting, 
Beret News, March 10, 1886); see also Paul Wake, Rights, and Free 
Government: Do Utahns Remember, Rev. 661,671 -91 (1996). 
15 
This early Utah problem with searches conducted without proper 
warrants was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. DeBooy, 996 P2d 
546,552 (Utah 2002) wherein it stated: 
This states' early settlers were themselves no strangers to the 
abuses of general warrants. Underlying the abuse of the general 
warrant was the perversion of the prosecutorial function from 
investigating known crimes to investigating individuals for the 
purpose of finding criminal behavior. A free society cannot tolerate 
such a practice. 
The late Justice Daniel Stewart also believed that history of the Utah 
Constitution provided a basis for a heightened expectation of privacy. In his 
concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1240 (Utah 1996), 
he indicated that because the framers of the Utah Constitution modified 
certain provisions in the Bill of Rights before they were placed in the Utah 
Constitution's Declaration of Rights, and even added certain provisions not 
found in the federal constitution, the Utah Supreme Court should not be 
bound to construe Utah constitutional provisions in light of federal law. The 
preparation of the Utah Constitution, perhaps more than any other state 
because of the history of federal statutory repression and warrantless searches 
surrounding the polygamy investigation, included the search and seizure 
provision desiring to ensure the protection of privacy of its citizens against 
16 
the type of repression that they had experienced theretofore. The unique 
history of the Utah Constitution therefore provides a basis for Utah courts to 
reach different, more protective decisions than would a federal court 
construing the Fourth Amendment. 
An equally important method of analysis recommended by the Utah 
Supreme Court is "textual construction of the provision". See State v. Earl, 
Id. at 806. On its face, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is nearly 
identical to the Fourth Amendment. The only textual difference between the 
two constitutional provisions is one of punctuation and grammar. Because of 
the close textual similarity between the two constitutional provisions, the 
Utah Supreme Court will not draw a distinction between the constitutional 
provisions based merely upon a textual analysis. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219,1221 (Utah 1988). 
Notwithstanding the textual similarity of the state and federal 
provisions, on more than one occasion, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
Article I, Section 14 provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth 
Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. For example, 
in State v. DeBooy, Id. at 554, the Utah Supreme Court held a traffic 
checkpoint to be unlawful under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The court distinguished a suspicionless roadblock upheld by the 
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United States Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976) and stated that Fourth Amendment precedent is persuasive, but 
not binding, when Utah courts are construing the Utah Constitution,Deito<7y, 
Id. at 550. The court noted that although the Utah and federal constitutions 
search and seizure provisions "contain identical language"... the court "will 
not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where 
doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens ,'7<d. 
at 549. Justice Durham stated that "multi-purpose, general warrant-like 
intrusions on the privacy of persons using the highways are unacceptable" 
and therefore violate the Utah Constitution. Id. at 554. 
Another case in which the Utah Supreme Court decided not to follow 
the federal standard is State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991). In 
Thompson, the court ruled that defendants have the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank statements. This decision 
directly contradicted the United States Supreme Court's holding in United 
States v. Miller in which the Court held that the government can seize bank 
records without a Fourth Amendment violation because a bank depositor has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed 
and justified its holding on the grounds that several commentators had 
heavily criticized Miller and other states that had faced the issue had also 
18 
rejected the Miller holding based upon their state constitutions. Thompson, 
Ida 416 -18. 
In sum, despite the similarity of the language between the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, section 14, the Utah Constitution has been 
construed as providing more protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure to the citizens of Utah than does federal constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, coupled with the underlying facts, the Appellant 
urges that the denial of his motion to suppress by the Trial Court be reversed. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2011. 
Thomas R. Bfonquis 
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Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
And 
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Mark L.Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JED OZZIE PRICE, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091900457 
Judge Mark DeCaria 
The above-named Defendant, by and through his counsel, hereby moves to suppress the 
toxicology final report obtained under a search warrant. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum of even date 
DATED this Jl^day of April, 2009. 
V. 
Thomas R. Btonquiat 
ADDENDUM 2 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JED OZZTE PRICE, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. 
) MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091900457 
) Judge Mark DeCaria 
This memorandum is filed to support the Defendant's motion to suppress the final 
toxicology report obtained in the above-entitled matter pursuant to a search warrant. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Defendant contends that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was insufficient 
to establish probable cause and that the results of the toxicology final report show that there was 
no probable cause for a search warrant to be issued for a blood draw. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I- The affidavit supporting the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable 
cause. 
Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must review an affidavit containing 
specific facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. See State v. Babbell, 110 P. 2d 
987, 990 (Utah 1989) and State v. Droneburg, 781 P. 2d 1303,1304 (Utah App. 1989). In 
addition, the magistrate must not merely ratify the bare conclusions of others. See Babbell, id at 
990-991 andDoneburg, id at 1304. 
The magistrate's task is to decide whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of the person supplying 
information... that there is a fair probability that... evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular case. See Babbell, id at 1991 and State v. Weaver, 817 P. 2d 830, 832-33 (Utah App. 
1991). 
The Defendant contends that the affidavit did not contain specific facts sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause and failed to disclose material facts showing that no probable 
cause existed. 
The affidavit disclosed that the Defendant blew into a portable breath tester, that showed 
positive for alcohol, however, it did not disclose that the result was a .008-blood alcohol level. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures interposes a magistrate between the investigating officer and the person 
who is the object of the search and requires the magistrate, before issuing a search warrant, to 
review the affidavit submitted to determine whether it established probable cause. Conversely, 
the investigating officer has the duty to disclose to the magistrate all relevant facts. This was not 
done in the above-entitled matter, therefore, the veracity of the investigating officer compromises 
the probable cause requirement. 
Point II- Results of the toxicology final report show that there was no probable cause for a 
search warrant to be issued for a blood draw. 
The toxicology final report was introduced into evidence at the preliminary hearing held 
on April 13th, 2009, over the objection of the Defendant. That report shows negative for alcohol. 
The affidavit for search warrant provides that 
Blood: Your Affiant is asking that a blood sample be collected for 
testing to determine Jed Ozzie Price's blood alcohol level. 
At the preliminary hearing the investigating officer testified that, prior to obtaioing the 
search warrant, he had asked the Defendant if he had been drinking and the Defendant said that 
he had not consumed alcohol that day. 
A search warrant was obtained, a blood draw was conducted on the Defendant and the 
toxicology final report shows negative for alcohol. 
This report supports the Defendant's denial of alcohol consumption and supports the 
Defendant's position that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for a 
blood draw. 
COUNCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant submits that his motion to suppress the 
toxicology final report be granted. 
DATED this J^Lrday of April, 2009. 
/Thomas R. Blopquist 
ADDENDUM 3 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JED OZZIE PRICE, 
Plaintiff, ] 
. Defendant. 
) SUPPLEMENT TO 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091900457 
) Judge Mark DeCaria 
This memorandum supplements the Defendant's April 27 , 2009 memorandum 
supporting his motion to suppress. 
Point III- The search warrant specifies that a blood draw be taken to determine the 
Defendant's blood alcohol level. 
Based upon the affidavit for search warrant, signed by Deputy Reed, a search warrant 
was requested "to determine Jed Ozzie Price's blood alcohol level". 
Even though Deputy Reed has been trained in the detection and recognition of drivers 
who are impaired by drugs, he did not request that the Defendant's blood sample be collected to 
determine whether or not he had drugs in his body. 
Because the search warrant specifies "alcohol level" and makes no mention of drugs, the 
question before the Court is whether the toxicology report showing THC is admissible. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Anderson v. Taylor, 149 P. 3d 352, 356 (Utah 
2006), stands for the proposition that in Utah the language of search warrants must be strictly 
followed. 
In Anderson, the question before the Utah Supreme Court was whether, following a 
search conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Fourth Judicial District Court, the 
requirements of Rule 40 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure were followed. The Court ruled 
that the requirements of Rule 40 must be strictly followed and concluded that the practice of the 
Fourth District Court was inconsistent with the statutory requirements. 
This position, viewed in conjunction with the language of the search warrant in the 
above-entitled matter, leads to the conclusion that the search warrant must be strictly interpreted 
and followed and, because the blood draw was to determine the Defendant's alcohol level only, 
evidence of drugs in the Defendant's system is inadmissible. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in its April 2009 decision in the case of State v. Dominguez, 
reached the same result. In that case, the Court was asked to consider whether the trial court 
erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search 
warrant. This case involved the question of whether or not the Second District Court, Ogden 
Department, complied with provisions of Rule 40. 
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In Dominguez, the Utah Court of Appeals took seriously Anderson's mandate that Rule 
40 be strictly enforced in Utah and ruled that the provisions of Rule 40 had not been followed 
and, as a result, the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Accordingly, the 
Court reversed the matter and instructed Judge Heffernan to grant the Defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
Of interest, is that in Dominguez the arresting officer observed, while speaking to the 
Defendant, his "red, blood-shot, glassy looking eyes, as well as slurred speech. Nothing of this 
nature was observed in the above-entitled matter. The only probable cause was that Deputy Reed 
smelled a "faint" odor of alcohol on the Defendant's breath and observed a reading of .008 on 
the portable breath tester. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant submits that his motion to suppress the 
toxicology final report be granted because: 
L No probable cause existed for a blood draw; and, 
2. The toxicology report shows negative for alcohol; and, 
3. Strict enforcement of the search warrant must exclude any readings or tests for 
THC. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2009. 
ADDENDUM 4 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
JED OZZIE PRICE, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 091900457 
Judge Ernie Jones 
The above-named Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby moves the 
that the Court reconsider its ruling from the bench on September 11th, 2009, denying the 
Defendant's motion to suppress, upon the ground that the case relied upon by the Court in 
making its decision is factually distinguishable, presents a different issue, and has no 
precedential value. 
This motion is accompanied by a memorandum of even date. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
/ 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 16th day of October, 2009, copies of the 
foregoing motion and supporting memorandum was hand-delivered to: 
BrandenB. Miles 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., STE 230 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JED OZZIE PRICE, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant. 
) MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) RECONSIDER 
Case No. 091900457 
) Judge Ernie Jones 
Though not required by Rule 12.(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this 
memorandum is prepared and filed by the Defendant based upon the belief that its contents will 
be of assistance to the Court as it considers and rules upon the Defendant's motion to reconsider, 
dated October 15th, 2009. 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11th, 2009, the Court ruled from the bench denying the Defendant's 
motion to suppress. In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the issue presented was one of first 
impression in Utah and stated that the basis for denying the motion was the "good language" 
found in the case of Pharr. v. Commonwealth ofVirgina, 646 S.E. 2d 453, 462, (2007). 
In the process of researching cases for and against the Defendant's motion to suppress, 
Defendant's counsel did not find the Pharr case and, therefore, was not aware of its holding 
when the case was referred to by the Court on September 11th, 2009. Having now studied that 
case, the Defendant has filed a motion to reconsider on the ground that the holding in Pharr has 
no probative value in the above-entitled matter, because it is factually distinguishable, it presents 
a different issue, it has no precedential value, and otherwise does not support the Court's denial 
of the Defendant's motion to suppress. 
LEGAL BASIS 
The legal basis for the Defendant's motion to reconsider is set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court rulings in Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), and Ron Shepherd 
Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994), that allow a Court to reconsider a 
ruling anytime prior to signing the order. 
The motion is timely because the order denying the Defendant's motion to suppress has 
not been signed. 
FACTS 
The facts relevant to the Defendant's motion to suppress are not in despite. They are: 
1. That on September 5th, 2008, officers from the Weber County Sheriffs Office 
responded to a fatal auto accident that occurred at Plain City, Utah. 
2. That it was determined that the Defendant failed to yield the right-of-way at an 
intersection and struck a crossing automobile. 
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That Deputy Ryan Read, a deputy of the Weber County Sheriffs Office, 
interviewed the Defendant at the scene and believed he could smell a slight odor 
of alcohol on the Defendant's breath. 
That as a result, Deputy Read asked the Defendant if he had been drinking and the 
Defendant responded that he had not consumed alcohol at anytime that day. 
That the Defendant agreed to submit to a sobriety test, conducted by Deputy Read 
using his portable breath testing device. 
That test results given by the portable Breathalyzer registered .008. 
That Deputy Read asked the Defendant to accompany him to the Weber County 
SherifFs Office and the Defendant agreed. 
That during the drive to the SherifFs Office, Deputy Read believed he could smell 
alcohol on the Defendant's breath. 
That when arriving at the SherifFs Office, Deputy Read requested that the 
Defendant submit to a blood draw to determine his blood alcohol level. 
That because the Defendant had already submitted to a breath test, he refused 
submit to a blood draw. 
That the Defendant was placed under arrest for driving with a detectable amount 
of alcohol in his system. 
That Deputy Read prepared a search warrant, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and an 
affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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13. That said search warrant is limited in scope to testing the Defendant's blood for 
alcohol content. 
14. That pursuant to the search warrant, the Defendant's blood was drawn and a 
sample thereof sent the Utah State Bureau of Forensic Toxicology. 
15. That the final toxicology report, attached hereto as Exhibit C, shows negative for 
alcohol and positive for THC. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I- The facts are distinguishable. 
The facts of the above-entitled case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in Pharr, Id. 
In Pharr, Mr. Pharr was arrested in June of 2001 in connection with the offense of breaking and 
entering with intent to commit rape. Detectives asked Mr. Pharr for a buccal swab from him so 
that they could compare his DNA to any DNA evidence found at the crime scene. Mr. Pharr 
stood up, opened his mouth, and let the detectives swab the inside of his mouth. 
After obtaining the buccal swab from Mr. Pharr, one of the detectives remembered 
similar circumstances of an unsolved case in August of 1999. Mr. Pharr's DNA was compared to 
the DNA evidence from the 1999 unsolved case and there was a match. Thereafter, Mr. Pharr 
was indicted for the 1999 offenses. 
A motion was filed to have his buccal swab and all related DNA evidence suppressed on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Mr. Pharr 
conceded that he voluntarily consented to the taking of the buccal swab so that police could 
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compare his DNA profile to any DNA evidence found at the scene of the 2001 case. He claimed, 
however, that the use, by police, of his DNA profile for comparison to DNA evidence recovered 
from the victim in an unrelated case constituted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that because Mr. Pharr voluntarily consented to the 
swab and that there were no express limitations placed on his DNA profile, the use by police of 
his DNA in an unrelated case did not constitute an improper search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The "good language" in Pharr, Id, relied upon by the Court in its bench ruling, is based 
upon the conclusion of the Virginia court that constitutional concerns had been satisfied because 
Mr. Pharr voluntarily consented to a buccal swab from him without expressing any limitation to 
its use. 
In the above-entitled case, constitutional concerns have not been satisfied if the express 
limitations in the warrant issued by the Court on September 5th, 2008, are not honored. The 
statement "Your Affiant is asking that a blood sample be collected for testing to determine Jed 
Ozzie Price blood alcohol level" in the affidavit for search warrant, Exhibit B, constitutes an 
express limitation. If that limitation is not recognized by the Court, the Defendant's 
constitutional rights have been violated. 
Point II- The issue in Pharr differs from the issue in the above-entitled case. 
The touchstone of the decision in Pharr, Id. centers around the concept of "a reasonable 
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expectation of privacy". The issue presented to the appellate court was whether or not Mr. Pharr, 
who voluntarily provided, without express limitation on its use, a DNA sample to the police 
during the investigation of a criminal offense, retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
sample sufficient to prevent the police from using it in their investigation of an unrelated offense. 
The court observed that to resolve the question it must determine whether the subjective 
expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as reasonable. It determined that society is 
unwilling to recognize as reasonable the subjective expectation of privacy infringed upon by the 
government when a DNA sample, validly obtained, without express limitation, from a suspect in 
one criminal case is used to analyze and compare the suspect's DNA in an unrelated criminal 
case. 
By comparison, in the above-entitled case the issue is whether or not blood drawn from 
the Defendant, pursuant to a search warrant that expressly limits testing to determine the alcohol 
level in the blood, can be used to show the THC level in the blood without violating the 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Defendant contends and case law supports that society will recognize that he retained 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, based upon the express limitation in the search warrant that 
his blood be tested only for alcohol. 
Point III- The Defendant never gave up his expectation of privacy when his blood sample 
was taken. 
In the case of Herman v. State, 128 P. 3d 469, 473 (Nev. 2006), it expressly states "A 
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person who volunteers DNA information for public use without expressly limiting the scope of 
his consent has no expectation of privacy in his DNA profile." Support of this fashion is also 
given in the case of State v.'McCord, 562 S.E. 2d 689, 693 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
In the above-entitled case, however, the Defendant did not consent to testing after Deputy 
Read's portable breath tester showed a .008 alcohol reading, and limitations of the sample were 
particularly expressed in the scope of the warrant. It was this particularity in the warrant's scope 
that satisfied the Defendant's constitutional rights. See State v. McCord, Id. 
Point IV- The evidence was not validly obtained for THC testing. 
Valid seizure of evidence is dictated by an officer's protocol in order to satisfy a 
suspect's constitutional rights. In a situation that does not involve consent, whether expressly 
limited or not, an officer or detective must satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that 
search warrants must describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a 
general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 
192, 196 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927). This requirement of particularly describing things to be seized 
makes general searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing (such as searching the 
blood for THC) under a warrant describing another (the search of blood for its alcohol level). 
Applying this to the above-entitled case, the Defendant's blood was validly taken only for the 
purpose of measuring his blood alcohol level. 
Point V- Express limitation dictated the scope of the search and seizure. 
Applying Marron, Id. case, it was reasonable for the Defendant to expect privacy in all 
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areas other than those specifically itemized in the scope if the search warrant. Therefore, the 
search of his blood for alcohol content was the only item validly authorized for scientific 
evaluation. 
Point IV- A case with both "good language" and good facts. 
In the process of researching case law for this memorandum, the Defendant's research 
team found the case of U.S. v. Carey, 172 F. 3rd 128 (10th Cir. 1999), a case with both "good 
language" and good facts. The entire decision is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
The Carey case centers around a search warrant allowing officers to search the files on 
Mr. Carey's computers for "names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other 
documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances." In the 
process of searching the contents, the detectives discovered that one file contained child 
pornography. At the trial court level, Mr. Carey moved to suppress the computer files containing 
child pornography and his motion was denied. 
The appellate court ruled that the detectives exceeded the scope of the search warrant and 
that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the child pornography obtained by the illegal 
search. The language that supports the Defendant's motion to suppress is highlighted in yellow 
on Exhibit D. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the facts that there was no consent given for a search of the blood for THC, that 
there was an express limitation provided by the scope of the search warrant prohibiting the 
8 
search of the seized blood for anything other than alcohol, and that the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights were infringed upon by a general search outside the express limitation of said 
warrant, the Court should reconsider its September, 11th, 2009, bench ruling and grant, rather 
than deny, the Defendant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
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ADDENDUM 6 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JED OZZIE PRICE, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 091900457 
) Judge Mark DeCaria 
This memorandum is filed to rebut matters raised in the State's response to Defendant's 
supplement to motion to suppress. 
INTRODUCTION 
This reply has been prepared and filed because in its memorandum, dated May 28th, 
2009, the State, by and through its attorney of record, relies upon State of Wisconsin v. Sanders, 
an unpublished opinion that has no precedential value and may not be cited, except in limited 
instances. 
The thrust of this reply is that 1] because the district court did not authorize the State to 
test the Defendant's blood for anything other than alcohol content, the scope of the search was 
violated; 2] the State violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution when it 
tested the Defendant's blood for a presence of a controlled substance; and 3] the results of the 
drug screening test should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I-The warrant called for a blood test for alcohol. 
The affidavit of Deputy Ryan Read was clear. It advised the Court: 
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, there is now certain 
property or evidenced described as: 
Blood: Your Affiant is asking that a blood sample be collected for 
testing to determine Jed Ozzie Price blood alcohol level. 
Deputy Read conducted no field sobriety tests at the scene, nor did he observe indications 
of drug use, such as a red or flushed face, pinpoint pupils of the eyes, or red or bloodshot eyes. 
The sole observation of the Defendant was the "faint" smell of alcohol on his breath. 
As a result, there is no room to argue that the warrant only authorized the State to test the 
Defendant's blood alcohol content. 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989): 
An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy 
interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that 
such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government 
agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is 
authorized by law, and that it is narrowly limited in its objectives 
and scope. 
That a warrant is to be narrowly limited to its objectives and scope was recently 
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enumerated by the Supreme Court of Utah in Anderson v. Taylor, 149 P. 3d 352, 356 (2006) and 
the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Dominguez, (2009). 
In the above-entitled matter, the warrant was narrowly limited in its objectives and scope: 
a search of the Defendant's blood for Alcohol content. 
Point II- Blood to be analyzed for alcohol content is a Fourth Amendment search. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a "compelled intrusion into 
the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment 
search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,768 (1966) and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753,760(1968). 
It is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the 
skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the 
sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the 
tested employee's privacy interest Skinner, Id. at 616. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Court continued: 
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analyses of urine, like 
that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an 
employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or 
diabetic. Skinner, Id. at 617. 
Skinner established that the search for data, other than alcohol, is further invasion of 
privacy. The warrant in the above-entitled case did not authorize testing the Defendant's blood 
for drugs, HIV, or other DNA information, blood type, or anything other than alcohol. 
Testing the seized blood for anything other than alcohol violated the scope of the warrant 
and was a further invasion of the Defendant's privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the facts developed at the preliminary and bail hearings to the United States 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals cases cited 
hereinabove, the Defendant urges that the Court rule that 
A. No probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant for a blood draw; 
and, 
B. Results of the toxicology final report be suppressed; and, 
C. The search warrant is narrowly limited to its objectives and scope; and, 
D. Testing seized blood for anything other than alcohol violated the scope of the 
warrant; and, 
E. Testing for drugs violated the Defendant's privacy and his Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
(To assist the Court in its deliberations, pertinent portions of all referred to United States 
Supreme Court decisions accompany this reply memorandum.) 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this day of June, 2009. 
ADDENDUM 7 
IN T H E SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF 
STATE OF UTAH 
WfflW m 
. SECOND 
1. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JED OZZIE PRICE, 
! Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER OF THE COURT 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 091900457 
m i«m 
Judge Emie W. Jones 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Briefs were 
submitted and oral argument was heard on September 11, 2009. The Defendant presents two issues 
in his motion to suppress the blood results. The first issue to be resolved is -whether there was 
sufficient probable cause for the blood draw warrant and the second is whether, having drawn the 
blood, the State was restricted in testing the blood for any substances other than alcohol. Having 
reviewed the affidavit, reviewed the testimony given at the preliminary hearing and bail hearing, and 
listening to oral arguments, the Court makes the following findings of fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The police were called to a fatal accident where the Defendant is alleged to have failed to 
yield the right of way by running a yield sign striking another vehicle on the driver's side, 
killing sixteen-year-old Chelsea Locher. It is not unusual or unreasonable that the^T / ^ /(c--^ 
would investigate whether drugs or alcohol are present and a possible factor in the 
accident. 
2. The initial accident happened at approximately 6:56p.m.. 
3. Upon contact with the Defendant, Officer Read smelled alcohol on the Defendant's 
breath and decided to administer a Portable Breath Test on scene. The test showed 
positive for alcohol. Findings of Fact, Conclusions ot Law and Order or tne cc 
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4. Officer Read was aware that Defendant was an alcohol-restricted driver. 
5. Initially, the Defendant agreed to be transported to the Weber County Sheriffs Office 
for further testing, however, when they arrived the Defendant refused to submit to 
further testing so Deputy Read prepared a search warrant affidavit to take a sample of 
the Defendant's blood. 
6. Utah law allows for a suspect's refusal to submit to chemical testing to be used in 
consideration of whether the person is operating under the influence of or has in his or 
her body, alcohol or drugs or both. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-524. 
7. Giving the issuing judge the appropriate deference, the officer adequately stated 
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant 
8. Even when the Court considers the affidavit with the Defendant's complained of parts 
redacted, the Court still finds that probable cause exists. Thus, the Court finds that the 
alleged inaccuracies are immaterial to the finding of probable cause. 
9. There is no evidence that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his neutral and detached 
role. 
10. There was no effort or intention to mislead or put false information into the affidavit. 
11. The warrant stated with reasonable specificity the place to be search and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
12. The officer acted reasonably obtaining the search warrant and in good faith reliance on 
the signed warrant. 
13. The search warrant was executed at 10:23p.m. by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Randy 
Linke. 
14. The search warrant states as its express object to seize as a sample of the Defendant's 
blood, but it does not contain language limiting the laboratory testing to be done on it. 
15. Once seized, the Defendant had no control or right to control the blood sample and it 
was sent to the Utah State Crime Lab for analysis. 
16. The Defendant could not reasonably expect a return of the blood sample to him. 
17. At the crime lab, testing was performed for alcohol and illegal controlled substances 
such as cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine. 
18. The analysis revealed the presence of THC in the Defendant's blood. 
19. As part of the blood draw, the Defendant was not required to submit more blood or do 
anything extra for the testing for illegal controlled substances than would have been 
required for the testing of alcohol alone. 
20. Although there is no Utah case exacdy on point, the case oiPharr v. Virginia, 646 S.E.2d 
453 (2007) contains language that is significant to this case. In that case, the court 
determined that once blood has been obtained through a valid warrant, the scientific 
analysis of that sample does not constitute a search. -^e-€eur^s^l«o^ersuadtid^y-the ~-^ £", 
reasenffig-^iHI^^ 
21. As with any other piece of physical evidence, once seized, a blood sample can be 
subjected to a battery of scientific testing. 
22. The Court finds that the testing done by the state lab in this case was limited to the 
object of the legitimate investigation, which was to determine the cause of the accident 
and whether the Defendant may have been impaired by substances that do not readily 
exhibit physiological signs. 
23. The Defendant's blood was not submitted for DNA testing or even for legal, controlled 
substances that would have revealed any sort of private medical facts about the 
Defendant unrelated to the investigation in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. 
2. The blood sample was lawfully taken from the Defendant. 
3. The police acted in good faith reliance upon the valid search warrant. 
4. Once the blood sample was lawfully taken from the Defendant, the Defendant lost any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the blood insofar as testing for intoxicants-whether 
alcohol or drug-related. 
5. The testing of this blood for alcohol and illegal, controlled substances was reasonable 
and justifiable given the circumstances of this case when balance against the compelling 
government interest in determining the causation of fatal accidents. 
6. The Court incorporates the reasoning set for in the State's Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress and the State's Response to Defendant's Supplement to Motion to 
Suppress. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
DENIED. ^ 
Dated this / * day of October, 2009 
•"Ernie W. Jones 
District Court Judge 
Prepared by: 
Branden B. Miles 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Approved as to form by:' 
Thomas R. Blonquist 
Counsel for Defendant 
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SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Deputy Ryan Read, I am 
satisfied that there is a probable cause to believe that: 
OB the person of: 
Jed Ozzie Price: Jed is a 26 year old male (4-28-82) who is &\" and 180 lbs. He has hazel eyes 
and brown hair. Jed is currently wearing blue jeans and a blue shirt. Jed was identified by him 
giving his name and date of birth which were both verified through the State Drivers Licence 
screen. 
In the City OF OGDEN, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or 
concealed certain property or evidence described as: 
Which evidence is: 
Blood. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
At anytime, day or night. 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the 
herein above described person, property or evidence, and if you find the same, or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, or retain such 
property in your custody subject to the order of this court. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
this day of__ 
1DGE 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT .,. . . 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the affiant has reason to believe that; 
On the person of: 
Jed Ozzie Price: Jed is a 26 year old male (4-28-82) who is 6rl" and 180 lbs. He has hazel eyes 
and brown hair. Jed is currently wearing blue jeans and a blue shirt. Jed was identified by him 
giving his name and date of birth which were both verified through the State Drivers Licence 
screen. 
That on the premise known as: :fa44s currently located at the Weber County Sheriffs 
Department. 
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Blood: Your Affiant is asking that a blood sample be collected for testing to determine Jed 
Ozzie Price blood alcohol level. 
That said property or evidence: 
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are: 
—avit for Search Warrarrt 
A , , , „ _ , . — ••«" mi) mi l mi m i 
ZiHHonrliim " Q " 
Your Affiant, Ryan Read is a Deputy with the Weber County Sheriffs Office and has been 
employed as a Deputy Sheriff for the past twelve years. Affiant is currently assigned as a DUI 
Enforcement Deputy. Your Affiant graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standards and 
Training Academy in 1996. Your Affiant has been trained in the detection and recognition of 
Drivers who are impaired by either drugs or alcohol and Standardized Field Sobriety tests. Your 
Affiant is currently certified by the State of Utah to operate an intoxilizer. Affiant has 
investigated over fifty DUI cases and has assisted other Deputies with many more. Your Affiant 
has receive training and has personal knowledge through his experience of the use of drugs and 
alcohol and knows how these things affect drivers. Affiant also understands how to detect if 
drivers are impaired by drugs and alcohol. Affiant has received training and has personally 
written and executed over one hundred search warrants. Your Affiant has received three 
distinguished service awards from the Weber County Sheriffs Office and numerous excellent 
work awards. Affiant was named the Utah Narcotic Officer of the Year in 2001. 
Your Affiant was dispatched to 2050 n 5900 w on a motor K|^le«accident. Upon my arrival 
your Affiant learned that a white truck being driven by Jed-Sfe^nfwas traveling north bound on 
5900 w and went through the intersection with 2050 n without yielding and struck a car on the 
drivers side. The intersection does have a yield sign for north bound traffic. A passenger in the 
car that was struck was killed in this accident. 
A check of Jed's Drivers licence status showed that Jed's DL is suspended for one year and he is 
an alcohol restricted driver. When I spoke to Jed about his licence status I could smell a slight 
odor of an alcohol beverage coming from his breath. I asked Jed if he had been drinking, Jed 
denied having anything to drink. I had Jed blow into a portable breath tester which did show 
positive for alcohol. I asked Jed if he would come to the Sheriffs Office so we could do a blood 
test. Jed agreed to come with me. Jed was not handcuffed. 
While driving to the Sheriffs Office when ever Jed would talk to me I could again smell alcohol 
on his breath. 
At the Sheriffs Office your Affiant read the DUI Admonitions to Jed and requested he take a 
blood and breath test. Jed refused to submit to either test. 
Jed was then placed under arrest for driving with a detectable amount of alcohol in his system. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items at 
Your affiant has Jed Price in custody right now and your affiant fears that if the blood evidence is 
not obtained right now, the evidence will be absorbed by the national course of the human body 
maJcing it difficult to collect the detectable amount of evidence of alcohol in the blood. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this. 
AFFIANT \ ^ 
o day of 9tttfd*fi&-, 20 °6 
JUDGE q\M7P.^ 
IN The 2nd DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Department 
of Health 
Utah Public Health Laboratories 
Bureau of Forensic Toxicology 
46 North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113-1105 
Telephone: (801) 584-8400 
Fax:(801)584-8415 
Lab Information 
Lab Case #: L2008-6406 
Sample*: 168564 
Source: Blood 
Date Received: 09/16/2008 
Date Completed: 09/29/2008 
AGENCY CODE: LE04A 
WEBER COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE 
RECORDS DIVISION 
721 W 12TH ST 
OGDEN, UT 84404-5405 
Subject Information 
Subject Name: PRICE, JED OZZIE 
Subject DoB: 04/28/1982 
Agency Information 
Submitting Officer: RYAN READ 
Agency Case # : 0832699 
Page 1 of 1 
TOXICOLOGY FINAL REPORT 
Test Run: Alcohol by Headspace GC 
Ethanol Result: Negative 
Test Run: Cocaine Screen 
Cocaine Result: Negative 
Test Run: Methamphetamine Screen 
Methamphetamine Result Negative 
Test Run: Morphine screen 
Morphine Result: Negative 
Test Run: THC by GC/MS 
THC Result: Positive 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is the principal psychoactive constituent of marijuana. 
When smoked it is rapidly distributed to various tissues and disappears quickly from the 
blood. If found (possible in blood only), it indicates either recent use or chronic daily use 
of marijuana. 
THCmtb Result: Positive 
11-Nor-9-Carboxy-THC is the primary metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol which is the 
principal psychoactive constituent of marijuana. It is an inactive metabolite, and may be 
detected in the urine for several days or weeks depending on the subjects frequency of 
use. 
Analyzed by: Othman Jaber 
<#. 
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